Chinese expedition to Tibet (1910)

Chinese expedition to Tibet (1910)
Date1910
Location
Result Qing victory
Belligerents
 Qing dynasty Tibet
Thirty-nine Hor tribes [zh]
Kingdom of Powo
Commanders and leaders
Qing dynasty Lian Yu[1]
Qing dynasty Zhong Ying [zh][2]
13th Dalai Lama
Kelsang Gyaltsen
Tsarong Dazang Dramdul

Worried about its national interests after a 1903 British expedition, Qing China in 1910 sent a military force of 2,000 troops to Tibet, then its protectorate, to increase its authority in the region. This led to turmoil in Tibet, causing the Dalai Lama to flee to British India[3] and a rupture in Sino-Tibetan relations.[4]

Background

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Since the early 18th century, Tibet was a self-governing protectorate under Qing China.[5][6] From then till the end of the 19th century, Tibet did not have an adult Dalai Lama and China played an increasing role in the internal governance of Tibet. China placed resident officials called ambans in Tibet who supervised the local administration.[7][a]

With the coming to age of the 13th Dalai Lama, the Tibetans started asserting their autonomy. They also expected to be consulted on all aspects of external affairs conducted by China on Tibet's behalf. The treaties signed with the British Empire in India regarding Tibet's border or trade relations were not recognised by the Tibetan officials, claiming that agreements signed without consultation were invalid.[8][9][10][11] Sensing a power vacuum in Tibet, the British sent an expedition to Tibet in 1904, led by Francis Younghusband, and signed their own treaty with Tibet. The Dalai Lama fled Lhasa before the arrival of the expedition, wanting to avoid the signing of the agreement.[12]

However, the British allowed China to salvage the situation. They loosened the terms of the Anglo-Tibetan treaty, allowing China to pay the war indemnity on Tibet's behalf in a shorter time frame, and giving recognition to China's authority over Tibet in a separate treaty with China.[13][14] They also signed a bilateral treaty with Russia in which Chinese suzerainty over Tibet was explicitly recognised.[15] The Chinese negotiators continued to maintain that China possessed sovereignty over Tibet, not merely suzerainty.[citation needed]

Reforms in Lhasa

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The international developments caused a reduction in the status of Tibet and increased the assertion of power by China. The Dalai Lama, who left Lhasa in the wake of Younghusband expedition, spent time Buddhist monasteries in Amdo and Mongolia, and eventually went to Beijing to see the Chinese emperor, where he received an inferior treatment as a subordinate.[16][17] During his absence, China implemented a variety of measures to increase its control over Tibet. Zhang Yintang, an official sent to negotiate with the British government in India, was appointed as the Imperial High Commissioner in Tibet. He introduced a variety of "new deal" reforms in the administration, vastly curtailed the British influence in Tibet, and managed to win over sections of Tibetan population. The amban, Lian Yu, had his own reforms to implement, which were said to be considerably less popular. The tensions between them caused Zhang to leave in June 1907.[18] After his departure, Lian Yu had an unobstructed run on the administration of Tibet.[citation needed]

Reforms in Kham

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Border between western and eastern Kham shown as the dark blue line (Simla Convention, 1914)

Concurrently, China was also beginning to exercise increased control over eastern Kham region, which had been nominally under its control since 1728.[b] China's route to Tibet passed through the region, giving rise to its nickname "march country" (through which the Chinese troops would need to march en route to Tibet).[20] In 1903, the Chinese officials in Sichuan decided to develop agriculture and mining in the area and used the Younghusband expedition to provide a renewed sense of urgency to the plan. The objective was to strengthen Chinese state control in the frontier area.[21][22]

The Qing court approved the plan in March 1904 and ordered the newly appointed assistant amban of Tibet, Feng Quan, to take his station at Chamdo.[23][c] Feng Quan decided to attempt the project at Batang (in eastern Kham, en route to Chamdo) and, within a hundred days, provoked the Batang uprising, in which he was murdered. The Qing court then appointed a new official Zhao Erfeng ("butcher Zhao"), who was already known for his tough methods, as the Imperial Commissioner for the Tibetan Marches.[25] Zhao reduced all the autonomous native states in both the western and eastern Kham by 1910 and converted them into Chinese districts governed by magistrates.[26] He signed an agreement with the Tibetan government setting the border between China and Tibet at Gyamda.[27]

Expedition

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The Qing Government sent the 1910 expedition to Tibet for establishing direct rule and reoccupied Lhasa.[28][unreliable source?] According to scholar Dawa Norbu, the British expedition and Treaty of Lhasa prompted the Qing government to ensure that they could establish firmer control over Tibet. Afterwards, the Dalai Lama fled to India.[29] Melvyn Goldstein, an American Tibetologist from the CWRU Center for Research on Tibet, indicated more specifically:

The [British] invasion of Tibet and the Lhasa Convention of 1904 dramatically altered Chinese policy toward Tibet. Until then, the Qing dynasty had shown no interest in directly administering or sinicizing Tibet. The British thrusts now suggested to Beijing that unless it took prompt action, its position as overlord in Tibet might be lost, and with Tibet under the British sphere of influence the English would be looking down from the Tibetan plateau on Sichuan, one of China's most important provinces. The Qing dynasty, although enfeebled and on the brink of collapse, responded with surprising vigor. Beijing got the British troops to leave Tibetan soil quickly by paying the indemnity to Britain itself and began to take a more active role in day-to-day Tibetan affairs. Britain's casual invasion of Tibet, therefore, stimulated China to protect its national interests by beginning a program of closer cultural, economic, and political integration of Tibet with the rest of China.[15]

After the outbreak of the Xinhai Revolution and the Xinhai Lhasa turmoil in 1911–1912, the Qing dynasty collapsed and was succeeded by the Republic of China. The 13th Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa and proclaimed an independent Tibet. All remaining Qing forces were expelled from Tibet.

See also

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Notes

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  1. ^ There were two ambans, one consider the chief amban and the other the assistant.
  2. ^ Tibetologist Melvyn Goldstein states: "In 1728 three large ethnic Tibetan areas in Kham were placed under the jurisdiction of Sichuan and three others under the jurisdiction of Yunnan province."[19]
  3. ^ Chamdo is in western Kham under Lhasa's control. So theoretically, the new amban would be in Tibetan territory but would be able to look after the frontier affairs. The previous assistant amban Gui Lin declined to take up the task citing health reasons, leading to the appointment of Feng Quan.[24]

References

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  1. ^ Ho, The Men Who Would Not be Amban (2008), pp. 231, 234.
  2. ^ Ho, The Men Who Would Not be Amban (2008), p. 212.
  3. ^ Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, Vol. 1 (1989), pp. 52–54.
  4. ^ Ho, The Men Who Would Not be Amban (2008), p. 232: "Thus began a fateful chain of events that would have grave ramifications for Sino-Tibetan relations in the twentieth century.".
  5. ^ Petech, Luciano, China and Tibet in the Early XVIIIth Century, Brill, 1972, p260, "(From 1661 to 1705), the Manchu emperors possess[ed] only that shadowy form of suzerainty, which they inherited from the Yuan and the Ming dynasties...The year 1710 saw the formal proclamation of the Chinese protectorate...After the Dsungar storm had blown over, from 1721-1723 the Tibetan government was supervised by the commandant of the Chinese garrison in Lhasa...In 1751 the organization of the protectorate took its final shape, which it maintained, except for some modifications in 1792, till its end in 1912. The ambans were given rights of control and supervision and since 1792 also a direct participation in the Tibetan government."
  6. ^ Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, Vol. 1 (1989), p. 44: "there can be no question regarding the subordination of Tibet to Manchu-ruled China following...the first decades of the eighteenth century.".
  7. ^ Norbu, China's Tibet Policy (2001), pp. 82–83: "If a strong amban (the title which replaced the Khan in 1711) coupled with a domestic or external crisis situation, coincided with a weak or minor Dalai Lama, Imperial China tended to take stronger measures, and to interfere more than usual in the internal affairs of Tibet.".
  8. ^ Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon (1997), p. 23: "Tibet, however, was not a party to these agreements and refused to cooperate in their implementation.".
  9. ^ Norbu, China's Tibet Policy (2001), p. 169: "The Tibetans showed profound disregard for the treaty stipulations by demolishing the new border markers (pillars). That is, the Tibetans refused to recognize the British takeover of Sikkim and consequently the newly defined boundary between Sikkim and Tibet.... In 1895 the Commissioner of the Rajashahi Division was told flatly at Yatung that, as the Convention was made by the Chinese only, the Tibetan Government refused to recognize it.".
  10. ^ Lamb, Tibet, China & India (1989), p. 6: "The Tibetans showed every sign of repudiating the Anglo-Chinese agreements of 1890 and 1893.".
  11. ^ Mehra, The Elusive Triangle (1990), p. 150: "Tibet also maintains that it did not accept the Anglo-Chinese Convention on Sikkim of 1890, nor the Trade Regulations framed under it three years later. It had not been consulted the drafting of either document.".
  12. ^ Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon (1997), p. 23: "[The British viceroy] realized that China had no practical control over events in Tibet, so he obtained permission from London to try to initiate direct communication and relations with Lhasa.... But China had no control over the Dalai Lama, who ignored these admonitions and fled to exile in Mongolia, fearing he would be compelled to sign an unfavorable agreement.".
  13. ^ Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon (1997), pp. 25–26: "Thus, at a time when China was unable to exercise real power in Tibet, Britain unilaterally reaffirmed Tibet's political subordination to China.".
  14. ^ Smith, Tibetan Nation (2019), p. 153.
  15. ^ a b Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon (1997), p. 26.
  16. ^ Van Praag, The Status of Tibet (1987), p. 41.
  17. ^ Chung, Comparing China's frontier politics (2018), p. 162: "The Dalai Lama's reduced standing demonstrated Beijing's intention to do away with Tibet's status as an autonomous dependency by exercising full sovereignty over it, and signaled that the traditional personal relationship between the (Dalai Lama) priest and his (Manchu Emperor) patron no longer existed.".
  18. ^ Ho, The Men Who Would Not be Amban (2008), pp. 217–220, 227–228.
  19. ^ Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon (1997), p. 16.
  20. ^ Mehra, The McMahon Line and After (1974), pp. 67–68: "What was strictly called the March country comprised the 'native' states on the Szechuan border east of the old Sino-Tibetan frontier on the Bum La. It embraced the kingdom of Derge, and the five Hor states, besides Chala or Tachienlu, Batang and Litang—the first two closely aligned to Lhasa, the latter three powerfully oriented towards Chengtu and Peking.".
  21. ^ Lamb, The McMahon Line, Vol. 1 (1966), p. 11.
  22. ^ Coleman, Making the State on the Sino-Tibetan Frontier (2014), pp. 197, 202–203, 216–217.
  23. ^ Coleman, Making the State on the Sino-Tibetan Frontier (2014), pp. 214–217.
  24. ^ Coleman, Making the State on the Sino-Tibetan Frontier (2014), pp. 214–215.
  25. ^ Lamb, The McMahon Line, Vol. 1 (1966), p. 192.
  26. ^ Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon (1997), p. 27.
  27. ^ McGranahan, From Simla to Rongbatsa (2003), p. 43.
  28. ^ Rai, C (2022). Darjeeling: The Unhealed Wound. Blue Rose Publishers. p. 55.
  29. ^ Norbu, Dawa (2011), Tibet: The Road Ahead, Ebury Publishing, p. 65, ISBN 978-1-4464-5968-3

Bibliography

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